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Impact of the Global Financial Crisis on Migration 
and Remittances
Sanket Mohapatra and Dilip Ratha
Remittances sent by international migrants worldwide are an
important source of external finance for many developing
countries. The global financial crisis has raised fears of a slow-
down or even a reversal of migration flows and a consequent
decline in remittance flows, especially to low-income coun-
tries. In this note, we present recent trends in, and the outlook
for, migration and remittance flows for 2010–11. 
Historically, remittances have been noted to be stable or
even countercyclical, and have tended to rise in times of fi-
nancial crises and natural disasters because migrants living
abroad send more money to help their families back home.
For example, remittance inflows increased to Mexico fol-
lowing its financial crisis in 1995, to the Philippines and
Thailand after the Asian crash in 1997, and to Central Amer-
ica after Hurricane Mitch in 1998. 
Unlike past emerging market crises, however, the current
crisis started in the high-income countries and has spread to
the developing countries, resulting in a global crisis. Migrant
destinations in both the North and South have been affected
to varying degrees; and that, in turn, is affecting employment
and income opportunities for migrants. For the first time since
the 1980s, remittances to developing countries are estimated
to have declined by a modest 6.1 percent in 2009. Unlike pri-
vate capital flows, remittance flows have remained resilient
through the crisis and have become even more important as
a source of external financing in many developing countries. 
Recent T rends in Remittances in 2009 
Officially recorded remittance flows to developing countries
in 2008 reached $338 billion (see table 1). This is three times
as large as overall official development assistance to devel-
oping countries, and larger than private capital inflows in
many countries. The true size of flows, including unrecorded
flows through formal and informal channels, is even larger.
For many states, remittances are now the largest and least
volatile source of foreign exchange, and for some countries—
such as Lesotho, Moldova, Tajikistan, and Tonga—they ex-
ceed one third of national income. 
Remittances to developing countries are estimated to have declined by 6.1 percent in 2009 as a result of weak 
job markets in major destination countries. Although new migration has fallen, it is still positive. The stock of
international migrants, therefore, has continued to grow and remittances have remained resilient. Going forward,
remittance flows to Latin America are expected to recover, whereas those to East Asia and South Asia are likely to
slow. Policy responses should involve efforts to facilitate migration and remittances to make these flows cheaper,
safer, and more productive for both the sending and the receiving countries.Based on high-frequency data for the first three quarters
of 2009, we estimate that remittance flows to developing
countries reached $317 billion in 2009, marking a 6.1 percent
decline from 2008. This decline, however, masks significant
variation across the developing regions. Remittance flows to
South Asia grew strongly in 2008, despite the global eco-
nomic crisis; but now there are risks that they may slow down
in a lagged response to a weak global economy. East Asia and
Sub-Saharan Africa also face similar risks. By contrast, remit-
tance flows to Latin America and the Caribbean and to the
Middle East and North Africa were weaker than anticipated
in 2009; but they appear to have reached a bottom already,
with the expectation of a recovery in 2010 and 2011.
Remittance flows to South Asia and East Asia have proved
to be stronger than our earlier expectations. Flows to Pakistan
increased by 23.9 percent in 2009, and flows to Bangladesh
and Nepal increased by 19.4 percent and 13.2 percent, re-
spectively (figure 1). Remittance flows to the East Asia and
Pacific region were also stronger than expected. In the Philip-
pines, a surge in the last quarter of 2009 increased remit-
tances by 5.6 percent (figure 1) as migrants sent money to
help their families affected by typhoons Ondoy and Pepeng.1
Remittance flows to countries in the Latin America and
the Caribbean region in 2009 show larger declines than were
expected earlier. In Mexico, they fell by 15.7 percent in
2009; and flows to El Salvador decreased by 8.5 percent (fig-
ure 2). However, the decline in flows appears to be bottom-
ing out in most countries across the region. This reflects the
fact that the crisis in the United States and Spain (particu-
larly in the construction sector)—key destination countries
for Latin American migrants—started sooner than the crisis
in other parts of the world. 
The Europe and Central Asia region is estimated to have
experienced the largest decline in remittance flows among
all developing regions in 2009, in part because of deprecia-
tion of the Russian ruble, relative to the U.S. dollar.
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Source: Ratha, Mohapatra, and Silwal (2009). 
Note: Remittances are defined as the sum of workers’ remittances, compen-
sation of employees, and migrant transfers. For data definitions and the entire
data set, see http://www.worldbank.org/prospects/migrationandremittances. 
a. Estimated.
b. Forecast.
Table 1. Remittance Flows to Developing Countries, 2006–11





Developing countries 235  289  338  317  322  334 
East Asia and Pacific 58  71  86  85  85  89 
Europe and Central  37  51  58  49  51  53
Asia 
Latin America and  59  63  65  58  59  61
Caribbean
Middle East and  26  31  35  32  33  34
North Africa
South Asia 43  54  73  72  73  76 
Sub-Saharan Africa  13  19  21  21  21  22 
Low-income countries 20  25  32  32  33  34 
Middle-income  215  265  306  285  289  300
countries
World 317  385  444  420  425  441 
Growth rate (%) 
Developing countries 18.3 22.9 16.7 –6.1 1.4 3.9
East Asia and Pacific 14.1 23.8 20.8 –1.5 0.8 3.7
Europe and Central  24.1 36.0 13.8 –14.7 2.7 5.0
Asia
Latin America and  18.1 6.8 2.3 –9.6 0.5 3.5
Caribbean
Middle East and  4.6 20.1 10.6 –7.2 1.5 3.3
North Africa
South Asia 25.3 27.1 35.6 –1.8 1.7 4.1
Sub-Saharan Africa 34.7 47.6 13.4 –2.9 1.8 3.9
Low-income countries 23.9 23.4 28.3 0.7 2.6 4.6
Middle-income  17.8 22.9 15.6 –6.8 1.2 3.8
countries















































Figure 1. Remittance Flows to Bangladesh, Pakistan, 
and the Philippines
Sources: Central banks of the countries represented.












































Figure 2. Remittance Flows to Latin America and the Caribbean 
Sources: Central banks of the countries represented.








NicaraguaRemittances to the Middle East and North Africa region
were also weaker than anticipated. Flows to Egypt (the
largest recipient in the region) declined by 15 percent; and
to Morocco, they fell by 9 percent in 2009. Sub-Saharan
Africa did relatively better, with flows to Nigeria, Kenya, and
Uganda showing higher growth or smaller declines than ex-
pected. Remittances to Cape Verde declined in U.S. dollar
terms in 2009, but were almost flat in local currency terms. 
Factors That Affected Migration and
Remittance Flows in 2009
The trends in global migration and remittance flows in 2009
appear to have been influenced by the following factors: (1)
effects of the economic crisis on migrant stocks, (2) efforts
by migrants to cut consumption, and (3) currency effects.
These factors are discussed below. 
Effect of current crisis on migration stocks and flows
Contrary to popular perception, remittance flows in a given
year are not directly related to migration flows during the
same year; instead, remittances are sent by almost the entire
existing stock of migrants (that is, cumulated flows of mi-
grants over the years). In understanding factors that influ-
ence the impact of the current crisis on remittance trends,
it is helpful to examine the impact of the crisis on the stock
of international migrants. The following stock-flow equation
for migration is useful in this context:
Mt = (1–d)Mt-1 – Rt + Nt, (Eq. 1)
where Mt = new migrant stock, Mt-1 = existing stock of mi-
grants, Rt = return migration, Nt = new migration, and d is
the death rate (plus assimilation rate, as applicable) of mi-
grants in the host countries. Equivalently, 
DMt = Nt – Rt – dMt-1, (Eq. 2)
where DMt is the change in migrant stock. In other words,
the change in migrant stock equals new migration net of re-
turn migration and deaths (and assimilation) of existing mi-
grants.
There is little evidence of return migration (Rt) as a result
of the financial crisis in Europe and the United States. On
the contrary, there are widespread reports that migrants are
unwilling to return to their countries of origin, fearing that
they may not be able to reenter once they leave because of
tighter immigration controls (See Awad [2009], Fix et al.
[2009], and Green and Winters [forthcoming]). Data from
the Mexican Migration Project show that the duration of
migration for Mexican migrants in the United States has in-
creased from 8 months in the early 1990s to 15 months
more recently (figure 3). In part, the reluctance to return
also reflects the significantly higher incomes that migrants
are earning in the rich countries, despite the crisis.
Financial incentives to encourage return migration are
also not working as expected in the Czech Republic, Japan,
and Spain. In part because of the weak response to financial
incentives, Spain and other European countries are now con-
sidering stronger immigration restrictions. Anecdotally, em-
ployers in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries
are also offering unpaid leave to migrant workers to encour-
age them to return home until the economy recovers; but
there appear to be few takers.
New migration flows (Nt) from many countries appear to
have been affected by the financial crisis and weak job mar-
kets in the destination countries, although flows are still pos-
itive.2 There has been a large fall in new deployments in
many migrant-sending countries; in Bangladesh, for exam-
ple, migration fell by nearly half in 2009, compared with the
number of migrants in the previous year. New migration
from Poland and other accession countries to the United
Kingdom has fallen, and the number of workers from those
countries employed in the United Kingdom has plateaued
since the start of the crisis. 
Developing countries with migrants in the GCC coun-
tries, such as Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan, and the
Philippines, have experienced smaller declines in remittance
flows. Dubai, which has been worst affected by the crisis, is
only one of the seven emirates of the United Arab Emirates;
and the only one that does not have oil. The substantial fi-
nancial resources and long-term infrastructure development
plans of the GCC countries imply that they will continue
to demand migrant workers. 
Some developing countries are also important destina-
tions for migrants—for example, India, Malaysia, the Russian
Federation,  and  South Africa.  Resource-rich  developing
countries, such as the Islamic Republic of Iran, Libya, Nige-
ria, and Sudan are also becoming attractive destinations for
migrants. It is hard to predict how outward remittances from
these destination countries in the South will be affected by















1982 1987 1992 1997 2002 2007
Figure 3. U.S.-Mexico Border Controls and Mexican Migrants’
Duration of Stay in the United States













border patrol agents (left scale) migration duration (right scale)the crisis, but some interesting cases involving currency ef-
fects are discussed below. 
Efforts by migrants to cut consumption
Remittances are a small share of migrants’ incomes, and they
typically continue to send remittances even when hit by in-
come shocks. Interviews with migrants in Dubai suggest that
many migrant workers have sent their families back home
and have reduced their daily expenditures in response to
wage cuts by employers. Migrants are also sharing accom-
modations to enable them to send remittances. Many mi-
grants who have lost jobs are not leaving; rather, they are
taking lower-paying jobs with other employers, and often
staying on illegally. There are anecdotal reports of family
members sending “reverse remittances” to help migrants. 
Currency effects
Exchange rate movement can be an important factor affect-
ing the U.S. dollar valuation of remittances. For example, in
U.S. dollar terms, remittance flows to the Kyrgyz Republic,
Armenia, and Tajikistan declined by 15 percent, 33 percent,
and 34 percent, respectively, in the first half of 2009, com-
pared with the same period in 2008. However, the Russian
ruble lost 25 percent of its value against the U.S. dollar in
the first half of 2009, compared with its average value in the
same period the previous year. If measured in ruble terms,
remittances to the Kyrgyz Republic actually increased 17
percent in the first half of 2009 on a year-on-year basis. In
Armenia, the year-on-year fall in ruble terms was only 8 per-
cent; and in Tajikistan, it was 10 percent. Similarly, a signif-
icant part of the decline in remittance flows to Poland can
be explained by the weakening of the British pound against
the U.S. dollar. 
Exchange rate movements also affect remittances through
their impacts on consumption/investment motives. As high-
lighted in Ratha, Mohapatra, and Silwal (2009), the depre-
ciation of the Indian rupee and the Philippine peso produced
a “sale effect” on housing, bank deposits, stocks, and other as-
sets back home. Indeed, as the Indian rupee has depreciated
more than 25 percent against the U.S. dollar, there has been
a surge in remittance flows to India (figure 4). There are signs
that a similar surge in investment-related remittance flows is
happening in Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Moldova, Nepal, Pak-
istan, the Philippines, and Tajikistan.
Outlook for Migration and Remittances 
in 2010–11
World Bank and International Monetary Fund estimates
show that economic growth is beginning to recover after the
global slump that began in 2008. Although recovery will
gather pace, according to the forecasts, growth will remain
weak in 2010 and 2011, and is unlikely to reach the brisk
pace seen before the crisis. In line with this outlook, and
based on our methodology of forecasting remittances using
a bilateral migration matrix and the World Bank’s forecasts
of nominal GDP growth, we have revised our forecasts for
remittances. Flows to developing countries are expected to
remain almost flat in 2010 (with a modest increase of 1.4
percent) and grow by 3.9 percent in 2011 (table 1). With
this sluggish pace of recovery, remittance flows are unlikely
to reach the 2008 level even by 2011.
The decline in remittance flows to Latin America and the
Caribbean appears to be bottoming out. However, partly be-
cause of the large declines in 2009, flows to Europe and
Central Asia and to Latin America and the Caribbean by
2011 are unlikely to recover to the pre-crisis levels of 2008.
Flows to other developing regions are expected to remain
weak in 2010–11. Although the outcome for remittances in
2009 turned out better than expected, the recovery in the
coming years is expected to be more shallow. 





















































b. India exchange rate
Source: Development Prospects Group, World Bank.











Dec. 2009One source of risk to this outlook is that the crisis could
last longer than expected. The emerging recovery in con-
struction and other sectors in the United States may not be
sustained after the effects of the stimulus package wear off.
The recovery in construction employment in the United
States has been driven in part by a credit to new home buy-
ers that has stabilized migrant employment in that sector
(figure 5). If this subsidy proves unsustainable, it could have
a dampening impact on the housing market. The recovery
in migrant employment in construction during the summer
may also be seasonal. A slowdown in construction activities
in the United States tends to affect remittance flows to Mex-
ico with a lag of four to six months (figure 6). 
Other migrant-sending countries may also experience a
lagged slowdown in remittance flows in response to slowing
activities in other destination countries. A deceleration in con-
struction activities in the GCC countries may affect migrant-
sending countries in East Asia and South Asia. Although a re-
covery in oil prices and fiscal stimulus implemented by GCC
governments is likely to help maintain employment levels for
existing migrants, new migration flows are unlikely to grow
over the next two years. Therefore, remittances from the
GCC countries may remain stable, but they are unlikely to
grow rapidly for a year or two. 
A second source of risk to the outlook presented here is
that weak job markets and persistently high rates of unem-
ployment in the destination countries may lead to further
tightening of immigration controls especially for low-skilled
migrants. Many economists are predicting a “jobless” global
recovery. The labor market in the United States is expected
to remain weak in the medium term, and unemployment
rates are expected to remain high. If employment recovers
only with a substantial lag to the recovery in economic out-
put, then it is likely to have an impact on the employment
levels and incomes of migrants—and, in turn, on their ability
to send remittances. 
A third source of risk is that currency movements are
highly unpredictable. If the currencies of receiving countries
start appreciating with respect to the U.S. dollar, then the
“sale effect” (remittances for investment in cheaper assets)
may reverse. This especially applies to India, which experi-
enced a surge in such flows during 2008. The abnormal
surge in remittances to Bangladesh and Tajikistan during
2007–08 may also prove unsustainable for the same reasons.
Policy Responses
With lower levels of foreign aid and investment likely over
the short term, remittances will have to shoulder an increas-
ing percentage of local development needs. Unfortunately,
the greatest risk to remittance flows does not come from the
economic downturn itself; instead, it comes from protec-
tionist measures taken by many destination countries, in-
cluding those in the developing world. There are risks that
more immigration controls to protect native workers might
imply a trade-off between protecting native workers from
job competition and protecting businesses facing falling rev-
enues. In the short term, allowing employers flexibility in
hiring and firing decisions may help them cut costs and sur-
vive the crisis. In the medium term, that might result in a
more sustainable recovery. 
Many migrant-sending countries are worried about large
return migration prompted by weak job markets in destina-
tion countries. Return migration in the current crisis appears
to be negligible so far; but if it happens, the workers coming
back home will return with skills, entrepreneurial energy,
and capital (see box 1). These workers should be provided






































Figure 6. Correlation between U.S. Construction Sector Activity and
Remittances to Mexico  

















































































Figure 5. U.S. Migrant Employment in Construction and Manufacturing




wholesale and retail trade
Apr. 2008with help in setting up small businesses and reintegrating
into their communities, not be made the object of envy or
fear of job competition.
To compensate for any reduction in new migration flows,
some migrant-sending countries are trying to establish guest
worker programs with destination countries. India is negoti-
ating mobility partnerships with some European countries.
Bangladesh and Nepal are trying to negotiate the continua-
tion of immigration quotas with Malaysia and the Republic
of Korea, respectively. The Philippines is actively searching
for new migrant destinations. 
Several countries are beginning to look at facilitating re-
mittances in the face of external financing constraints, includ-
ing introducing incentives to send more remittances through
formal channels. For example, Pakistan has introduced a pro-
gram that subsidizes remittance service providers for a cer-
tain part of their marketing expenses, depending on the
volumes transferred. Countries are also trying to facilitate
cheaper and faster remittances. One of the potentially cheap-
est and quickest options is money transfer using mobile
phone networks. However, significant regulatory challenges
related to anti-money-laundering initiatives and efforts to
counter the financing of terrorism remain for cross-border
transfers using mobile phone networks. 
A standard remittance is a simple financial transaction
that—if lightly regulated and processed using modern technol-
ogy—can cost as little as 1 percent of the amount transferred.
Many remittance providers currently charge fees of more than
10 percent. Reducing remittance costs would require improv-
ing competition and transparency in the remittance market,
applying a simpler and identical set of regulations across
state and national boundaries, and increasing the use of
postal networks and mobile phone companies. Exclusive
partnership arrangements between money-transfer compa-
nies and the postal and banking networks of most countries
are a hindrance to competition among firms offering remit-
tance services. Sharing of payment platforms with multiple
partners should be encouraged.
If funds were transferred through banks and other finan-
cial intermediaries, migrants and their beneficiaries would
6 POVERTY REDUCTION AND ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT (PREM) NETWORK www.worldbank.org/economicpremise
Box 1. Resilience of Remittance Flows, Relative to Other Types of Flows during the Current Crisis
Despite the prospect of a sharper decline in remittance inflows
than anticipated earlier, these flows have remained more resilient
than many other types of resource flows (such as private debt
and equity flows and foreign direct investment that declined
sharply in 2009 as foreign investors pulled out of emerging mar-
kets). There are several reasons for the resilience of remittances
in the face of economic downturns in host countries:
• Remittances are sent by the cumulated flows of migrants
over the years, not only by the new migrants of the last
year or two. This makes remittances persistent over time.
If new migration stops, then remittances may stop growing
over a period of a decade or so. But they will continue to
increase as long as migration flows continue.
• Remittances are a small part of migrants’ incomes, and
migrants continue to send remittances when hit by in-
come shocks.
• Because of a rise in anti-immigration sentiments and
tighter border controls, especially in Europe and the United
States, the duration of migration appears to have in-
creased. Those people staying in the host country are
likely to continue to send remittances.
• If migrants do return to their home countries, they are
likely to take accumulated savings with them. This may
have been the case in India during the Gulf War of 1990–
91, which forced a large number of Indian workers in the
Gulf to return home (Ratha 2003). Also, the “safe haven”
factor or “home bias” may cause remittances for invest-
ment purposes to return home during an economic down-
turn in the host country. Migrants not only bring back
savings; they also bring business skills. Jordan’s economy
performed better than many observers had expected be-
tween 1991 and 1993 because of the return of relatively
skilled workers from the Gulf. 
• Most high-income remittance source countries in the Or-
ganisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
have undertaken large fiscal stimulus packages in re-
sponse to the financial crisis. This increase in public ex-
penditure, if directed to public infrastructure projects, will
increase demand for both native and migrant workers.
Taylor (2000) has found that public income transfer pro-
grams in the United States resulted in increased remit-
tances  to  Mexico:  when  all  other  things  are  equal,
immigrant households that received social security or un-
employment insurance were more likely to remit than
were other immigrant households. Also, documented mi-
grants are likely to send more remittances to their families
to compensate for a fall in remittances by undocumented
migrants.7 POVERTY REDUCTION AND ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT (PREM) NETWORK www.worldbank.org/economicpremise
be encouraged to save and invest. Intermediary banks could
also use remittance inflows as collateral to borrow larger
sums in international credit markets for local investments. 
The development community can leverage remittance
flows for development by making them cheaper, safer, and
more productive for both the sending and the receiving coun-
tries. An “International Remittances Agenda,” as summarized
in figure 7, would involve (1) monitoring, analysis and pro-
jections, (2) improving retail payment systems through use of
better technologies and appropriate regulatory changes, (3)
linking remittances to financial access at the household level,
and (4) leveraging remittances for capital market access at the
institutional or macroeconomic level. 
Notes
1. Remittance flows to Haiti are also likely to surge in 2010,
in response to the devastating earthquake in January; see
http://www.ssrc.org/features/pages/haiti-now-and-next/13
38/1438/.
2. Green and Winters (forthcoming) have examined mi-
gration trends during several past crises (in the 1831–1913
period and the Great Depression in the 1930s), and con-
clude that host-country economic factors usually were a
much stronger determinant of migration than were origin-
country factors. Passel and Suro (2005) report a similar find-
ing  for  Mexican  migration  to  the  United  States  in  the
1992–2004 period. (See also Hatton and Williamson 2009.)
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Figure 7. International Remittances Agenda 
1. Monitoring, analysis, projection
• size, corridors, channels
• countercyclicality
• effects on poverty, education,
health, investment
• policy (costs, competition, exchange
controls 4. Capital market access
• private banks and corporations
(securitization)
• governments (diaspora bonds)
• sovereign credit rating
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
Note: MFI = microfinance institution.
2. Retail payment systems
• payment platforms/instruments
• regulation (clearing, settlement,





• deposit and saving products
• loan products (mortgages,
consumer loans, microfinance)
• credit history for MFI clients
• insurance productsReferences
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